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Abstract 
In the context of modern nation-states, borderlands occupy a unique space as they are typically inhabited by groups 
with two different cultural or social identities. There are two important factors in the creation of heterogeneous 
identity in borderlands: geo-physical conditions and migration flows. In the case of borderlands, migration is not 
limited to the moving of people or goods but also includes how ideologies are embedded in one region and 
transplanted to another region. This process of ideological movement has been one of the main focuses for many 
prior borderland studies. Nonetheless, most analyses have concluded with examinations of how identity is 
restructured in relation to the creation of a group consciousness or feeling of togetherness. In contrast, this study 
aimed to answer two main questions. First, it inquired as to how migrants reconstructed their identities either in the 
individual or collective level. Second, it examined how they give meaning towards their reconstructed identities. To 
answer these questions, I conducted a case study of cross border trade in Mae Sod with a focus on individuals an 
ethnic migrant group, Burmese b Muslim traders. Data presented in this study was gathered using participant 
observations of the Burmese Muslim community in Mae Sod as well as in-depth interviews with persons involved 
with cross border trade. In addition, I have also conducted archival research to help analyze the arguments of this 
study. The role of Burmese Muslims within cross-border trade in Mae Sod is classified as significant since it can be 
viewed in various scales, from small into big traders. In terms of identity reproduction, this study argues that Burmese 
Muslim traders defined identity not only as an effort to grow the feeling of togetherness or solidarity through the 
traders viewed the identity of Islam as social capital, as their identity gives them access to a broad, inter-ethnic, cross-
national network. However, Burmese Muslim traders connected though Muslim networks based not only on religious 
practice but also in their socio-economic practice. In this case, the Muslim network accommodates much information 
or knowledge related to cross border trade in Mae Sod for Burmese Muslim traders. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Borderland is located between two different sovereignties and it is chanced to be inhabited by the 
citizens with multiple identities. Before the modern nation state, peoples' movement between states could 
not be monitored and often occurred without governance. Each person or group would bring their 
identities from their old location to their new location. The emergence of modern nation-states, mapping 
technology, and national identities obstructed both the movement process and the reconstruction of 
identities. New rules, such as those governing passport and visa applications, caused movement across 
national borders to be more difficult and in many cases restricted segments of the population. Moreover, 
for those persons or groups who have successfully completed trans-national migration, building national 
identities in the host countries becomes a new problem which sometimes places them into marginalized 
groups. 
 In this way, identity is, therefore, contested, both in the borderlands and within nation states. While 
the nation state has become the dominant force in defining identities, there is still great variance in 
identity both within states and in borderlands. I may argue there will always raise an effort of contest and 
negotiation from people or group towards pressure of nation state. This is particularly true in the case of 
those who feel marginalized. On the other hand, some cooperation by nation states in response towards 
global flow has sometimes given space for the process of identity reconstruction. To examine this 
phenomenon, I used a case study of Mae Sod by focusing on two different levels of related analysis: 
macro and micro level. I used the macro level to answer two main questions, how do states deal with their 
borderlands in the globalized age? And how was the impact in context of borderland identities? On the 
micro level, this study examined questions including how an ethnic group reconstruct their identities and 
how they give meaning towards those identities. 
 This paper presents empirical data which I collected during a month visit to Mae Sod. The data were 
divided into two parts: interview results and participant observations. In order to strengthen some 
arguments in this paper, I have also done background research pertinent to the topic. This paper has three 
parts: 1) How political state-making caused Mae Sod into a region with a complex identities; 2) How the 
inhabitants, particularly ethnic minorities, reconstructed their identities in Mae Sod; and 3) How ethnic 
minorities give meaning to and manipulate their identities to survive despite economic, social, and 
political pressures. 
 
2. Background of Analysis 
 
Discussions of identity typically involve the concepts of race, gender, kinship and blood. These four 
concepts are the main patterns traditionally used for identifying those who belong to 'us' and those who 
belong to 'them'. As these concepts are typically immutable, they create an idea of identity as given, fixed, 
stable and unchanging. Conversely, constructivism views identity as something which is constructed, 
fluid and unstable [1-4]. In order to illustrate the constructivist approach to identity, scholars have 
investigated how nation states create homogeneous national identity [5] to grow the feeling of 
togetherness, national consciousness and loyalty for society [6]. Yet, national identity is sometimes 
considered unfair if it is constructed based on ethnic majority as happened in China [3], Singapore [7], or 
Malaysia [4]. It is not rare that conflicts emerge between state and marginalized ethnic minorities [8-9]. 
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Even so, while there may be ideological conflict, it does not always result in overt conflict due to 
consciousness of the imbalance in power relations. Rather than outright conflict, minority groups may 
manipulate their identities and became a part of majorities through assimilation processes in areas of life 
such as politics, economics and education [2, 4, 10, 11]. Barth [1] analyzed this situation and argued that 
identity as social construction is a situational and manipulative process. In this case, identity becomes 
flexible insofar as it is constructed according to the occurrence of economic or political conditions. In the 
context of migration and ethnic minority studies, there are many scholars who view the reconstruction of 
e of togetherness, solidarity, and 
groupness at the new place [9, 12]. Minority groups, through imagining a common language, history and 
culture, grow their solidarity and contest majority domination. From this case, we can observe how 
identity becomes a capital form. Though the work of identity as capital is only symbolic, the power 
produced has been sometimes bigger than material or financial capital.  
3. Contextualizing Borderlands Within Free Trade Regimes 
Free trade regimes in the Mekong region emerged in early 1990, when the idea of economic integrity 
was adopted by four upper Mekong countries: Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Southern China [13-14]. The 
integrity in multiple cross border activities. In relation to free trade, this cooperation facilitated the 
construction of transportation facilities which connected across major trading routes. The establishment of 
the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) in 1992 caused the national economic agenda for member 
countries to be more concentrated on the development of border areas, particularly in Thailand [15]. One 
development agenda in the eight development plans (1997-2001) included the design of special economic 
zones and tax-free zones along the borders. These were designed to cover the industrial sector and 
promote either trade or investments in Thailand and neighbouring countries.  
The height of this development agenda occurred in 2003 and involved the establishment of four 
Special Border Economic Zones (SBEZ) in Mae Sod-Myawaddhi (Myanmar), Mukdahan-Savannakhet 
(Laos), Trat-Koh Kong (Cambodia) and Chiang Rai (Thailand) under the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-
Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) [15, 16, 17]. The design of the SBEZ (or simply 
SEZ) as an effort to facilitate free trade regimes in Mekong countries seems to deny the meaning of 
borders in modern nation-state era, that is, fixed, stable and static [18]. According to Ong [19], the 
construction of SEZ in Southeast Asia was the same as designing a borderless zone in an effort to make 
flexible management inside the border sovereignty. She argued that this flexibility was a state strategy 
al protection, control, and 
  
As a result, we can see why each country in the Mekong region has precisely tried to re-establish 
flexible borders in their region, particularly related to economic integrity under free trade regimes. Some 
applied exceptions become attractive to those persons or entities which aim to take advantage in 
borderlands. This causes the populations in these borderlands to be complex and heterogeneous, since 
there are not only indigenous people but also migrants from the respective sovereign states and from 
further afield. An example is Mae Sod, which transformed from a remote, sparsely populated area into a 
border town [15] with drastic economic growth. This change has caused the area to be a destination for 
investors, migrant labour and traders. The design of SEZ as response towards global flows has precisely 
comes in different motifs and backgrounds which will trigger changes to socio-cultural, economic and 
political aspects of life in the borderland. 
855 Wahyu Kuncoro /  Procedia Environmental Sciences  17 ( 2013 )  852 – 859 
4. Reconstruction of Personal and Collective Identities in the Public Sphere 
Although identity has always been related with place, we cannot deny that identity is also embedded 
within the personality of individuals [20-22]. On this logic, identity has become mobile and is taken by 
each person wherever they go. They do not only take it along but also attempt to reconstruct that identity 
in the new place, though in different ways. This process, of course, cannot run linearly since various 
pressures at host countries often push a person or group to give up their identity or demand that it be 
assimilated through an existing identity. This influence of globalization has led towards fluidity of 
identity in borderlands. Opening borderlands towards people flows has been cited as one of the causes of 
heterogeneous identities in such areas. This is necessarily against the principle of the modern nation state, 
which has up to this point attempted to make identities homogeneous. Through a case study of Mae Sod, 
we will examine how states accommodate and give space for the reconstruction of identity.   
As previously mentioned, regionalism through international border integrity in Mekong countries has 
been a regional response towards globalization. This caused some borderlands to become flexible and 
representing an open space for the flows of commodities into ideology [13, 15, 23]. In case of Mae Sod, 
state flexibility has not only been shown through how flows are facilitated but also in how states negotiate 
flexibility against existing identities in those regions. When I came for the first time to Mae Sod, I was 
surprised by a monument in the middle of the street at the exact centre of town. That monument was not a 
'welcome' sign or related to a Mae Sod memorial. Instead, I found that it was built as a symbolic 
recognition of Mae Sod as a space open towards ethnic and religious differences. Inside of the monument, 
there are five different religious symbols drawn on each wall. Through the construction of the monument, 
the state has attempted to designate Mae Sod as a plural area in which different ethnics and religious 
groups peacefully coexist.  
Aside from the above circumstance, when I came to Mae Sod, I saw that state seemed to give space 
for Burmese migrants to cultivate their identity through the implementation of festivals presenting 
Burmese artists in order to celebrate the King's birthday. As I monitored during two nights in that festival, 
most of the guests were Burmese nationals, either living in Mae Sod or Myawaddhi. They came in groups 
wearing and using their performative identities, such as Burmese language, tanakac, sarong or chewing 
betel nut, which allowed us to easily recognize them in comparison to Thai people. Except the guests, we 
were also able to meet some Burmese traders during the festival who sold all kinds of commodities 
typical of the Burmese like betel nut, Burmese DVDs and Burmese foods. The second night that I joined 
the festival, I observed the guests were still predominately Burmese, more so than the previous night. I 
came to the conclusion that the increase of guests was caused by an artist presented that night. He was a 
very popular artist in Burma.  
In another case, we can also view state flexibility towards Muslim identity in Mae Sod through the 
existence of the 'Islam Bamroong' road. Most ethnic Muslims, particularly Burmese Muslims, built the 
settlements and opened their businesses along the road. Moreover, around Islam Bamroong road, we can 
also find one of the main mosques in Mae Sod and an Islamic School. Muslim here is easily recognized 
since most of them wear Islamic costumes. Most male Muslims usually wear a cap and Muslim dress, 
whereas the women cover their heads with hijabd. While in Mae Sod, I visited three different stalls around 
the Islam Bamroong road managed by Burmese Muslims. I was a little bit surprised because they did not 
put any photographs or pictures of the King as is done in Thai restaurants. In contrast, they placed objects 
related to Islamic identities, such as pictures of Mecca and writing in Arabic calligraphy. 
 
c Traditional powder in yellow color used by most of the Burmese and pasted on their face 
d nd head. 
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This group collectively expresses its identity through religious practices and routines. For example, 
during Friday prayer, the imam e gives recitations in regard to Islamic values which should be practised 
by every Muslim. On Sunday morning, while I was having breakfast in a restaurant opposite the Mae Sod 
mosque, I saw there was a recitation there. The interesting thing is that the leader of that activity spoke 
Burmese instead of Thai. In addition, some songs in Arabic were also sung by the imam. In the case of 
Muslims, I argue that through religious identities and religious practice, the group has been growing a 
group consciousness. The expectation is certainly related to building solidarity between Muslims without 
looking at ethnic differences as the background. This has become a key to existence in the middle of 
various pressures in the host country both from the nation state and the majority group.    
I will conclude this chapter by way of answering the question of why the state seems to give space to a 
group to do a process of reconstructing identities. This surely cannot be due to the weakness of the state at 
its outermost territory, or due to the emerging influences of global flows. In my opinion, the state has 
been using this space to keep their labour resources from migrating to other places due to the poor 
condition of life. As migrant worker, Burmese Muslims are burdened by the total amount of costs for 
health insurance and work permitf [15], whereas their daily wage in Mae Sot has been so far the lowest if 
it is compared to another provinces like Chiang Mai, Songkhla, Nonthanburi and Bangkokg [24]. If many 
of them chose to relocate away from the borderland, then labour resources in Mae Sod would decrease, 
negatively influencing productivity of the industrial sector and growth in other economic sectors. Giving 
space to reconstruct their identities and maintaining their identity makes them feel more comfortable, 
even if they receive poor working conditions. 
 
5. Manipulating and Reconstructing Religious Identity as a Social Network 
 
After viewing the flexibility of state sovereignty towards Mae Sod, which has created a town with 
multiple identities, in this section I will look at Muslim communities more specifically. As I previously 
explained, in Mae Sod each actor has been trying to reconstruct their identity. This includes Burmese 
Muslim communities. In the previous section I focused on the process of reconstructing identity on the 
individual and collective levels through the use of performative identities and the maintenance of 
religious practices. Within this section, I focus on how Burmese Muslim communities give meaning to 
their religious identity. As a religious identity, the actors within it are not homogeneous, as groups consist 
of ethnics including Thais, Burmese, Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Yunnanese. Through their language and 
physical make-up, each of these ethnics tries to construct the same religious identity. Individually, they 
use Islamic performative identities, such as wearing a cap, Muslim wear (for men) and hijab (for women) 
in their daily life. 
As I analyze, those Muslim ethnic that I mentioned previously is not only maintaining Muslim 
identities to show who they are in the new place, but also for commercial reasons. The case of Burmese 
Muslims in Mae Sod has shown that identities are not only constructed as a mark distinguishing 'Muslim' 
and 'non-Muslim', but also relating to trade networks. They use Muslim identity as a network to produce, 
consume, and distribute commodities because of its strength and broadness compared to other ethnic 
networks.  
 
e The person who leads prayers in mosque; a title for various Muslim leaders; an Islamic  leadership positions. In Thailand, Imam 
has an authority not only in religious practice but also related to various group activities either in economic, social or politic.  
f The total cost (including medical check up, health insurance and work permit) that should be spent by every migrant worker 
depends on the expire duration of work permit, 2,450 THB for three months, 2,900 THB for six months and 3,800 for a year. 
g The government policy on April legitimated that 300 THB as daily minimum wage has been worked out in seven provinces: 
Bangkok, Nonthaburi, Samut Prakan, Samut Sakhon, Nakhon Pathom, Phatum Thani and Phuket. For Chiang Mai, the daily 
minimum wage is 254 THB, 246 THB for Songkhla, whereas Tak (Mae Sod) is 226 THB per day. 
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One Burmese Muslim I spoke to was Ahmad,h a former imam in one of Mae Sod's mosques that I 
accidentally met in Mae La camp when he visited his family there. He was born in Burma and grew up in 
Mae Sod, as his parents migrated when he was almost 5 year old. Since he grew up in Mae Sod, he got his 
education under Thai institutions. Thus, he could speak both Burmese and Thai very well. In Mae Sod he 
lives on one of the corners at Islam Bamroong road and opened a small shop managed by his wife who 
comes from the same group as him. Besides working on his business, he also has another business in Mae 
Sod which sells second-hand motorbikes. He said that today in Mae Sod, particularly among Burmese 
Muslims, there is a trend of buying and selling second-hand motorbikes because it is highly profitable. In 
addition, in the maintenance of his second-hand motorbike business, he strongly utilizes the Muslim 
network he has both within and beyond Mae Sod. For example, he buys second-hand motorbikes from 
Ayuthaya and Bangkok through his relatives and his Muslim friends there. After he gets his orders, he 
repairs and modifies them to look much better than before and resells them in Mae Sod. Most of his 
customers are Muslims in Mae Sod, either of Burmese ethnicity or some other Muslim ethnicity. 
In addition to Ahmad, I also met two other individuals who illustrate on different levels how Burmese 
Muslim use Muslim networks to facilitate their trading activities. Isa and Anass, two sibling Burmese 
Muslims, sell cigarettes, Viagra and sex tools on the Moi riverbank. They use their Muslim network to get 
the various commodities they trade. Both Isa and Anass reported that most traders in Moi riverbank come 
from the same group, the Burmese Muslim. Most products they sell are illegal products from China. 
According to Isa and Anass, they get those products from their relatives and some Muslim networks 
living in Rangoon. When they run out of commodities, they return to Rangoon to buy products they need. 
Due to networks they already have in Rangoon, they do not need to find the products as everything they 
need is packed, prepared, and ready for pick up.  
Muslim network has been also used by Fatimah, a dried fish trader living for almost 30 years in a 
Muslim settlement around a factory located close to the SAW (Social Action for Women) office. She 
trades fish in two different places, the central market and a temporary market around the factory. She has 
a network in Rangoon, where she is originally from. Thus, she still has some relatives living there. When 
she sells out of her commodities, she calls her relatives in Rangoon through her close friend in Mae Sod 
to order more dried fish. She said that she gets her fish through two different means: the first one is 
through her close friend in Mae Sod who procures them in Rangoon, and the second is her relatives from 
Rangoon who take ordered fish to Myawaddhi then cross the border to Mae Sod. However, Muslim 
networks are not only used by migrants who come to Mae Sod, but also by the local society of both 
Muslims and non-Muslims. 
Muslim networks which connect migrants and local people (particularly Thai Muslims) have 
represented a symbiosis mutualism, in which both parts gain an advantage. According to Ahmad, most 
Burmese Muslim migrants coming to Mae Sod will stay in their relatives' house at the beginning of their 
stay or rent a house from a Thai Muslim. He said that most Thai Muslims have their own houses or lands 
to be rented to newcomers, especially other Muslim ethnics. Muslim network is not only used by Muslim 
ethnics, but also by other actors in Mae Sod such as private companies who manage the no. 9 pieri. The 
work of this pier is to accommodate various export-import flows, particularly hard commodities and non-
expired items, when the checkpoint is either opened or closed. Jib, the officer of pier no. 9, said most of 
those who use her service are Burmese Muslims from Myawaddhi who import second-hand commodities 
 
h The names of informant in this paper are not the original names in order to avoid the undesirable things, as the information given 
are considered as sensitive issue as well as keeping their privacy. 
i Along the Thai-Myanmar's border in Mae Sod, there are some piers managed by private company used as alternatives check point 
in various export-import commodities, see also. Lee Sang Kook 2007 
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from Japan, such as cars or bicycles. Besides using transportation services, they also rent buildings in the 
vicinity to sell the modified second-hand bicycles to customers in Thailand.  
The manager is required to keep and give the best facilities for customers, particularly ethnic Muslims, 
in order to keep them satisfied so that they do not move to another pier. For instance, one effort done at 
pier no. 9 to keep Muslim customers was the building of a special room for Muslims to pray in. Jib said 
that if Muslim customers feel happy, then they will always use the service on that pier and that they might 
even tell their experiences to their ethnic group. When a Muslim customer feels satisfied on the service 
given to them by the pier, they will relate their experience to another Muslim. This information will, 
again, continue to other Muslims. On the other hand, if the service was unsatisfactory, then, it would 




The observations and analyses made above lead us to view identity as a social construction which is 
unfixed, situational and manipulated. Identity has been constructed not as limited to how a person or 
group exists, but also related to the growth of solidarity or a feeling of togetherness. An example is the 
building of national identity in the modern nation-state era, which has in turn been used to grow national 
consciousness and loyalty in society. Through national identity, nation-states have attempted to build 
homogeneous identities by pressing as well as obstructing the process of constructing identities of other 
ethnics. In spite of this, we should not view building national identities as a complete process of state 
control, as it is limited in the borderland area, where alternative identities are reconstructed from actors' 
constituent identities. This has not been caused only by the location of borderlands at the periphery, with 
the concomitant weakness of state control. Rather, it is also supported by regulations made by nation-
states which support globalization. As a result, borderlands occupy a unique space created by actors with 
complex ethnic identities. 
In the case of Mae Sod, the design of a plural society has been shown through the construction of a 
monument which is standing in the middle of the downtown. Its multiple ethnic symbols deny the 
homogeneous construction of identity. The physical condition of that town is quite unique as many 
advertisements and traffic signs are written in two languages, Thai and Burmese. In regard to social life, 
we can also view how performative identities beyond the Thai identity are constructed in other areas of 
town. One of them is Islamic identity, which is being reconstructed by some ethnics in most areas of the 
town. There is even a road which has become an exemplar of Muslim civilization named 'Islam 
that there are two main reasons why a person or group prefers reconstructing 
religious identities. The first is that reconstructing religious identities tends to be more acceptable by the 
authorities in the modern nation-state era than the identities based on other ethnics. Secondly, religious 
networks are considered to be broader as the members within them are not limited to a single race or 
ethnicity. Religious issues are sometimes more sensitive in growing solidarity and the feeling of 
togetherness of particular groups. In addition, broader religious networks are being used and utilized by 
both network members as well as outsiders who wish to gain access to financial capital.  
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